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7.1  Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United States and U.S. direct 
investment abroad (DIA) are both important economic phenomena and 
a source of  political controversy. In  1980,  FDI reached  $17 billion, 
about 22% as large as net domestic fixed investment. Correspondingly, 
DIA reached $19 billion, about 25% as large as net domestic investment 
in plant and equipment. Since 1980, there has continued to be sub- 
stantial FDI, but DIA has fallen precipitously. Further, the sources of 
finance for FDI and the uses of  earnings on DIA have changed dra- 
matically in the past few years. 
Tax policy has therefore become concerned with these flows, in both 
directions.  For  example,  the  Accelerated  Cost  Recovery  System 
(ACRS), adopted in  1981 and amended in 1982, was limited expressly 
to investment in  the United States. The primary motivation behind 
ACRS was to increase U.S. domestic capital formation,  but a secondary 
concern, evidenced in the hearings preceding its adoption, was to stem 
the flow of  U.S. investment abroad, 
Further, FDI is often seen as an important  justification for continuing 
the U.S. corporate income tax, even among those who favor corporate 
and personal tax integration. Another policy relevant to revenue (and 
perhaps location of  investment) was the per-country limitation to the 
foreign tax credit in the administration’s tax reform proposal. 
There are undoubtedly a wide variety of  reasons for multinational 
firms to invest outside of  their home country: access to markets, po- 
litical considerations, labor costs, proximity to suppliers, and expected 
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economic conditions, to name a few. Often, the reasons may be specific 
to an industry, firm, or even a product. In addition to these other forces 
shaping the international location, tax laws also potentially affect the 
attractiveness of U.S. direct investment abroad and of foreign direct 
investment in the United States, as well as the repatriation of earnings 
and/or capital. The major changes in incentives for U.S. domestic in- 
vestment enacted in 1981 and 1982 (ERTA and TEFRA, respectively), 
combined with the trends in FDI and DIA and the current tax reform 
proposals that might substantially affect tax rates on DIA and FDI, 
lead me to reexamine the extent to which tax policy  influences the 
international location of investment. 
In section 7.2, I begin with a brief review of the literature. Section 
7.3 discusses definitions and trends in the data. My results are  presented 
in section 7.4. Section 7.5 then applies these results to the 1981-82  tax 
changes and discusses the welfare effects of tax policy. 
7.2  A Brief Review of  the Literature 
Domestic tax policy affects the international location of investment 
primarily through two channels: the home country’s tax policy toward 
investment located there and its tax policy toward foreign source income. 
Domestic tax policy on investments made in the home country affect 
both FDI at home and DIA by home country firms, because tax policy 
alters the relative rates of return available at home and abroad. Entre- 
preneurs investing capital will naturally be attracted to locations where 
the (risk-adjusted) rate of return is highest.  Of  course, this channel 
hinges on the substitutability of foreign and domestic investment for a 
firm. However, the common conception of foreign and domestic in- 
vestment as alternative methods of producing the same good and/or 
serving the same (geographic) market suggests that there is some sub- 
stitution between locations of investment. Thus, there are good theo- 
retical reasons for domestic tax policy to affect both  FDI and DIA 
through its impact on relative rates of return. 
The importance of taxes on foreign source income has long been a 
subject of debate. There are two major approaches to taxation offoreign 
source income. In the “territorial”  approach, the company pays no 
home country taxes on foreign income. In the “residence” approach, 
the company does pay home country taxes, but often a credit or de- 
duction is allowed for taxes paid in the host country. The United States 
uses the residence approach and allows a credit for taxes paid to other 
countries. 
David Hartman (1981, 1984,  1985) has pointed out that, contrary to 
popular wisdom, the taxation of foreign source income may not affect 
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draws attention to the distinction between investment financed out of 
retained earnings abroad and investment financed by  transfers from 
home. If the subsidiary is investing out of retained earnings, then the 
home country tax on foreign source income does not affect the marginal 
investment decision, because the repatriation of earnings, not the earn- 
ings themselves, are the tax base. The home country tax on foreign 
source income is unavoidable, and its present value does not depend 
on the length of  deferral. Thus, the marginal investment decision for 
investment out of retained earnings should depend only on net returns 
available in the home country or the host country. 
For firms that finance foreign investment by transfers from home, 
the home country tax on foreign source income does matter because 
no foreign earnings have accrued. Thus, the tax on foreign source 
income is avoidable. One implication of  this theory is that a foreign 
affiliate should never simultaneously  repatriate earnings and draw funds 
from home, since this creates a completely avoidable tax liability. Hart- 
man defines firms that finance foreign investment by retention of earn- 
ings as “mature” firms and those that finance investment by transfers 
from home as “immature.”  He argues that a large part of U.S.  DIA 
is undertaken by  mature firms, since approximately 70% of  DIA in 
1975-79  was financed by retained earnings. In recent years DIA fi- 
nanced by retained earnings has risen even further. Thus, the U.S. tax 
on foreign source income may  not  affect DIA to any great extent. 
However, if major revisions in tax policy occur frequently (as has been 
the case), then a firm will have an incentive to wait for lower rates, so 
the theory may not hold exactly. 
7.3  Data 
7.3.1  Introduction 
Foreign direct investment refers to the infusion of funds into a U.S. 
subsidiary by the foreign parent or to the retention of earnings by that 
subsidiary.’ U.S. direct investment abroad is defined equivalently for 
the foreign subsidiaries of  U.S.  parent companies. 
Two aspects of  this definition merit comment. First, FDI and DIA 
are not necessarily the dominant aspects of international capital flows. 
As of the end of  1983, FDI in the United States equaled approximately 
1.  The  Bureau of  Economic Analysis defines a U.S.  affiliate as “a U.S.  business 
enterprise in which a foreign person owns or controls, directly or  indirectly, at least 10 
percent of the voting securities of an incorporated U.S.  business enterprise or an equiv- 
alent interest in an unincorporated business enterprise.” See U.S.  Department of Com- 
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18% of all foreign assets in the United States, while U.S. DIA repre- 
sented 25% of U.S. assets abroad (Scholl 1985). 
Second, FDI and DIA are not exact counterparts to domestic net 
investment figures. For example, inflows of funds (or retention of earn- 
ings) are not necessarily used to purchase real capital assets, so FDI 
may overstate real foreign net investment. On the other hand, U.S. 
borrowing by the U.S. subsidiary is not part of the calculation of FDI. 
Nevertheless, Hartman (1981, 1984) suggests that it is reasonable to 
use direct investment numbers as net investment. 
7.3.2  Trends 
Table 7.1 presents summary data on trends in FDI and DIA.2 Foreign 
direct investment has grown 2,000% in real terms from 1950 to 1984. 
Large swings characterize the last third of this period, with tremendous 
growth from 1977 to 1981, a collapse of 50% in 1982 and 1983, and a 
doubling in 1984. The FDI figures are also large in relative terms. In 
every year since 1980, FDI has been more than 20% of U.S. nonres- 
idential net investment in plant and equipment. This is especially note- 
worthy for 1984, because net investment in the United States rose by 
over 100% of its 1983 level. The composition of the sources of FDI 
has also changed over time. Since 1977, the percentage of FDI financed 
by retained  earnings has fallen substantially. This has occurred con- 
temporaneously  with the large rise in FDI documented in column 1, 
Table 7.1  Foreign Direct Investment and Direct Investment Abroad Selected 
Years, 1950-84  (Current $ Millions) 
Year  FDI  DIA 
1950  270  1,096 
1960  315  2,941 
1970  1,464  7,589 
1979  11,876  25,222 
1980  16,918  19,222 
1981  25,195  9,624 
1982  13,792  -  4,424a 
1983  11,946  5,394 
1984  22,514  4,503 
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce (1983, 1984); and various issues of the Survey 
of  Current Business. 
Note: For calculation of real FDI and DIA, cited in the text, note that the GNP deflator 
in 1950 = 53.5;  in 1984 = 223.4. 
1982, DIA financed by  retained earnings was positive, but  U.S.  affiliates abroad 
transferred home more funds, so net DIA was negative. 
2. All data on FDI and DIA have been obtained from U.S. Department of Commerce 
(1983, 1984) or selected issues of the Survey of Current Business. 77  Tax Policy and the International Location of Investment 
thus suggesting that investment financed by intercompany debt and 
equity flows has dominated FDI for recent years. 
U.S. direct investment abroad grew steadily through  1979 but has 
since collapsed,  representing a large and continuing  repatriation  of 
funds to the United States. Real DIA in 1984 was only 2% higher than 
it was in 1950. These observations are reinforced by examination of 
DIA as a percentage of U.S. nonresidential net investment. The DIA 
was consistently 20% or more of net investment in the 1960s and 1970s 
but has collapsed to 11% or less since 1981. 
As of the end of 1984, the positions (net capital stocks) in FDI and 
DIA were $159 billion and $235 billion, respectively.  Approximately 
one-third of the FDI position is in manufacturing and one-sixth is in 
petroleum. These two industries also account for 40% and 25% of the 
DIA position, respectively. Not surprisingly, European countries rep- 
resent the largest share of both positions. Although Japan accounts for 
only 9.3% of the FDI position, this figure has risen from 2.1% in 1975 
and 6.4% in 1979, it should be noted. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, 
capital inflows may occur predominantly in forms other than FDI. 
Thus, even a cursory examination of the data suggests that both FDI 
and DIA can be  substantial.  The wide  swings further suggest  that 
international investment flows may  be  very  sensitive  to current  or 
anticipated conditions. 
7.4  Results 
My study’of  FDI and DIA uses alternative sample periods, functional 
forms, and sets of explanatory variables. In each case, because of the 
theoretical considerations discussed, I separately analyze investments 
financed by retained earnings and investments financed by intercom- 
pany transfers of debt and equity. Sample periods are 1965-79,  1965- 
84, and 1956-84.  To ensure comparability with other studies, I focus 
on estimates of FDI and DIA as a proportion of GNP. The main ex- 
planatory variables are rates of return and tax rates here and abr~ad.~ 
Other variables are also used, such as adjusted output and measures 
that control for the energy price rises in the 1970s, but they turn out 
not to affect the results very much. 
In general, the results indicate that tax policy can have an important 
effect on the international location of investment. Here are presented 
some examples for 1965-79.  A fuller analysis and accompanying dis- 
cussion are presented in Boskin and Gale (1987). 
The results indicate that FDI financed by retained earnings is quite 
responsive to the return on FDI. A 10% rise in the return (e.g., from 
3. All  tax-rate and rate-of-return data have been obtained from Feldstein and Jun 
(1987). Further details on data issues are presented in  Boskin and Gale (1987). 78  Michael J. Boskin 
10% to 11%) increases annual FDI by about 14%, corresponding to an 
elasticity of  1  .4.4 The elasticity with  respect to foreigners’ average 
return in the United States is about 0.9.5 FDI financed by transfers is 
less sensitive to the return on FDI but slightly more sensitive to vari- 
ations in foreigners’ average return in the United States.6 
DIA is very sensitive to the net rate of return on DIA.7 It is also 
moderately sensitive to variations in  the net return available in  the 
United States.* These results hold up under the alternative specifica- 
tions. They indicate that a 10% rise in the return on DIA (e.g., from 
10% to  11%) increases annual DIA by  12%; a 10% rise in the return 
available in the United States decreases DIA by about 2%. 
7.5  Summary and Implications 
I have presented new evidence that U.S. domestic tax policy affects 
the international  location of investment. While the results are somewhat 
sensitive to the sample period, functional form, and other considera- 
tions, the qualitative conclusions tend to hold up well. Two empirical 
issues are particularly interesting: the likely impact of  the  1981-82 
corporate tax changes on FDI and DIA and the corresponding  potential 
effects of  any corporate tax reform. However, the welfare aspects of 
the international location of  investment are also important. 
My  estimates of  the impact on DIA of  changes in the after-tax rate 
of return in the United States suggest that for every dollar of increased 
U.S. domestic investment, there is a reduction of  approximately four 
cents df DIA. This estimate comes from a comparison of  analogous 
coefficients on domestic investment equations estimated by Feldstein 
and Jun (1986). It refers only to investment out of retained earnings. 
Transfers from domestic parent companies to foreign subsidiaries, or 
the establishment of  such subsidiaries, are also likely to respond to 
domestic tax policy, but the data are insufficient to reach any specific 
conclusions on that matter. 
I estimate that a tax policy that raises the after-tax rate of  return 
enough to lead to a dollar of  increased domestic investment in  the 
United States brings with it between eight and twenty-seven cents of 
FDI. These results are consistent with Hartman’s (1981, 1984). 
4. This elasticity is estimated to be 1.0 in equations using alternative sample periods. 
The return on FDI is calculated as FDI income divided by the FDI position. 
5. In other sample periods, this elasticity varies substantially, but averages about 1.2. 
Foreigners’ average return in the United States is the overall rate of return in the United 
States multiplied by one minus the tax rate paid at the corporate level. 
6. Alternative functional forms and explanatory variables lead to the same qualitative 
conclusions. 
7. The return on DIA is calculated as DIA income divided by the DIA position. 
8. The net return in the United States is the overall rate of  return multiplied by one 
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Several studies have analyzed the effect of  the 1981-82 investment 
incentives on effective marginal tax rates (e.g., see Auerbach  1983; 
Feldstein and Jun 1987; Gravelle 1983; or Hulten and Robertson 1983). 
These studies generally find that the effective corporate tax rate was 
reduced by about 20%35%.  With a constant before-tax rate of return 
and a pre-ERTA effective tax rate of about 33%, the tax changes in- 
creased foreigners’ average net return in the United States by  10% 
17%. Other things equal, this change in net return would bring about 
approximately a 2%4%  decline in DIA and an 11%20%  rise in FDI. 
This would imply capital inflows of about $0.5-$1 .O billion from smaller 
DIA and $244  billion in increased FDI. Of course, these figures refer 
only to FDI and DIA out of retained earnings. Likewise, a tax reform 
such as HR 3838, which raises (except perhaps at very high inflation 
rates) the effective tax rate on U.S. corporate investment, would result 
in an increase in direct investment abroad by U.S. firms and a decrease 
in FDI in the United States. However, because these results contain 
no long-term dynamic theory of the optimal international location of 
investment, they should not be taken as a final guide to the impacts of 
these tax changes on investment patterns. 
Finally, I should address the welfare economics of the international 
location of investment, described in Caves (1982); Goulder, Shoven, 
and Whalley (1983); and Hartman (1984). Domestic economic welfare 
rises with FDI because the United States receives a claim on the rate 
of  return to foreign capital through the taxation of FDI income. Con- 
versely, domestic economic welfare falls when U.S. firms substitute 
DIA for investment at home, because the nation then receives only the 
net-of-foreign-tax return (and only when it is repatriated) rather than 
the gross return. These welfare effects are augmented by the beneficial 
effects on labor productivity of greater foreign or domestic investment 
in the United States. Thus, a reduction in taxation of new corporate 
investment improves welfare through three  channels:  the  standard 
mechanism, through which lowering the effective marginal tax rate 
generates new domestic investment opportunities for U.S.  firms; a 
reallocation of the location of investment by U.S. firms toward home 
and away from abroad; and an increase in FDI. In this paper, we have 
presented some new evidence that these last two effects are quanti- 
tatively important and therefore that it is necessary to consider them 
in any evaluation of  domestic investment incentives. 
The welfare effects of tax policy clearly depend on the responsive- 
ness of FDI and DIA to net-of-tax returns. The welfare gains to a tax 
reduction on new corporate investment in the U.S. are positively linked 
to the responsiveness of DIA and FDI with respect to net-of-tax returns 
in the United States. 
My  results suggest that accelerated depreciation or tax credits for 
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the corporate level by lo%, would raise FDI by 9% through their effect 
on the net-of-tax return available to FDI. Corporate tax revenues from 
the taxation of FDI could be expected to rise correspondingly. Similar, 
though smaller, revenue effects would occur for DIA. These results 
refer only to investment financed by retained earnings. However, tax 
revenue is greater per dollar of  potential DIA diverted to domestic 
investment than per dollar of  FDI, because foreign owners of  U.S. 
capital pay taxes only at the corporate level, while domestic owners 
are also responsible for state, local, and personal taxes. 
My results suggest that the tax effects on the international location 
of  investments are important. Tax policies such as ACRS and ITC, 
which raise the after-tax rate of return on new investment  without losing 
revenue from previous investment, not only stimulate domestic fixed 
investment but also attract additional investment from abroad. The 
additional investment supplements the impact of  domestic investment 
on productivity and raises corporate tax revenue. However, my results 
should be taken as preliminary estimates, not as definitive statements 
about the long-run impacts of  tax policy. 
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